This paper studies separation payments made when CEOs leave their firms. In a sample of 179 exiting Fortune 500 CEOs, more than half receive severance pay and the mean separation package is worth $5.4 million. The large majority of severance pay is awarded on a discretionary basis by the board of directors and not according to the terms of any employment agreement. For the subset of exiting CEOs who are dismissed, separation pay generally conforms to theories related to bonding and damage control. Shareholders react negatively when separation agreements are disclosed, but only in cases of voluntary CEO turnover.
discouraged from concealing adverse information (Inderst and Mueller, 2005) , entrenching themselves in office (Almazan and Suarez, 2004) , or shirking when their dismissal appears possible (Berkovitch, Israel, and Spiegel, 2000) . Under a separate theory, separation pay may serve as an instrument of damage control when CEOs are ousted, helping the board protect corporate secrets and head off litigation or adverse publicity.
Although golden parachutes have been investigated at length by researchers, 2 no study has studied separation agreements for CEOs who retire or get dismissed by their boards. This Though their value is not dramatic relative to certain benchmarks, separation packages represent a puzzle because firms usually are not required to pay them. The large majority of separation pay in my sample -83 percent -is not delivered pursuant to a previous employment contract, but instead is granted to CEOs on a discretionary basis by their boards of directors.
CEOs who are dismissed are far more likely to obtain separation pay compared to CEOs who retire voluntarily (91 percent vs. 47 percent), and their awards are several times larger, with a mean value of $15.1 million (median $6.5 million) compared to a mean of $2.3 (median zero) in cases of normal retirements. Dismissed CEOs also obtain the large majority of their separation pay -76 percent -from discretionary awards rather than existing employment contracts.
To gain insight into the reasons that firms award severance pay, I estimate a regression model based upon the ex post settling up, bonding, and damage control theories referred to above, and also a fourth theory related to managerial rent extraction (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) .
I also analyze the stock market returns upon the disclosure of CEOs' exit packages. Within the subsample of CEOs who retire voluntarily, regression analysis fails to support for either the ex post settling up or rent extraction theories. However, for the subsample of CEOs who are dismissed, severance pay appears to occur in patterns that match the predictions of several bonding theories as well as the damage control theory. Analysis of abnormal stock returns upon the disclosure of separation packages reveals a negative and significant reaction in cases of voluntary CEO retirements and an insignificant reaction in cases of forced CEO removal. These results are consistent with a prediction of the damage control theory.
Payouts to CEOs when they leave their posts indicates that turnover, whether planned or forced, serves as a type of "compensation event" in which top managers can obtain extraordinary one-time rewards on top of their regular annual pay. The findings complement other recent research into one-time rewards for CEOs who agree to sell their firms (Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack, 2004) , CEOs who change jobs (Fee and Hadlock, 2003) , and CEOs who make acquisitions (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004) . Together these studies indicate that understanding top management incentives requires looking beyond routine annual compensation and examining one-time events, which might also include spinoffs, IPOs, equity carveouts, and even bankruptcies or liability restructurings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews theoretical models of separation pay for top managers. Section II describes the data and sample selection. Section III presents regression analysis of the value of separation packages. Section IV contains analysis of stock market reactions to the disclosure of these pacts. Section V concludes the paper.
I. Theories of CEO separation pay
The passages below discuss four theories of severance pay: ex post settling up, bonding, damage control, and managerial rent extraction. The first and last theories appear to apply to voluntary CEO turnover, while the other two seem more relevant for involuntary dismissals.
A. Ex post settling up
When a CEO concludes a successful career, the ex post settling up theory would predict a lump-sum exit payment if the CEO had been underpaid during his career. Fama's (1980) intertemporal model of CEO wages serves as the foundation of this theory, under which a board of directors continually obtains new information about the CEO's human capital value, decoding noisy signals sent via the company's performance. Changes to a CEO's compensation take account of this new information period by period, through a wage smoothing dynamic that Fama labels "ex post settling up." So long as the performance signal received by the board has uncertain precision, the board will not engage in full settling up with the manager period-byperiod, but instead will revise wages gradually over time as new performance signals are received. Though Fama's model does not deal explicitly with payments to a CEO who reaches retirement, a clear implication is that a manager who retires after a successful career may receive a large exit package, since his human capital contributions could have exceeded those perceived by the board during his career (this will not be true of all retiring CEOs, since boards might realize ex post that some had been overpaid). The board could refuse to acknowledge an implicit ex post settling up arrangement and deny a CEO the exit package, but this would send adverse signals to other managers in the organization including the successor CEO.
Empirically, ex post settling up predicts an inverse association between separation pay and the extent to which a CEO is overcompensated, relative to the market value of his human capital, in the years leading to retirement. For dismissed CEOs, the expected level of separation pay should be zero for ex post settling up purposes, since these CEOs' ex post human capital value likely fell below the level perceived ex ante by the board. It is important to recognize that an inverse association between prior compensation and a CEO's severance could exist for other reasons than ex post settling up. Some CEOs may enter into employment contracts assuring them of large separation packages or work for firms with histories of awarding large severance pay. Holding all else constant, these CEOs should obtain reduced annual compensation as consideration for the security of a large prospective exit package. The resulting coincidence of low annual compensation and high separation pay would be the result of an ex ante endogenous relation rather than ex post settling up.
B. Bonding
When CEOs are dismissed for poor performance, separation payments might represent the payoffs of explicit or implicit contracts entered into by the firm to provide insurance for the CEOs' human capital value. Models of severance pay in this framework appear in Berkovitch, Israel, and Spiegel (2000) , Ju, Leland, and Senbet (2002) , Almazan and Suarez (2004) , and Inderst and Mueller (2005) . These papers generally analyze moral hazard or governance problems that arise when CEOs alter their behavior because they perceive a potential for shareholders to dismiss them. These problems are related to inadequate risk-taking, shirking, entrenchment in office, and incomplete disclosure of information. Risk taking is analyzed in all four papers as well as the CEO compensation literature generally. With either a concave utility function and/or private benefits from his position, the CEO may avoid investments that have a positive net present value but increase the probability of adverse outcomes leading to dismissal.
Shirking may arise if a CEO feels that his replacement has become likely, and that additional effort would do little to help him keep his job; Berkovitch et. al (2000) analyze this case most closely. CEO entrenchment, modeled by Almazan and Suarez (2004) , refers to the possibility that a CEO could be surrounded by a weak board of directors and elect to remain in his position and collect a stream of rents, though shareholders would prefer that he be removed. Incomplete disclosure, the focus of Inderst and Mueller (2005) , represents an alternative strategy for CEOs to remain in office and collect rents by keeping shareholders unaware of negative information.
Severance pay in each model serves as a bonding device through which shareholders promise the CEO a minimum lifetime income and also raise the costs to themselves of changing managers. In cases of risk aversion or effort avoidance, CEOs would be more likely to pursue value maximizing strategies due to the security provided by severance pay. Grace & Co. and Sprint Corp. are representative examples of companies that negotiated generous separation packages with dismissed CEOs under circumstances in which litigation would have been unsurprising. In both cases, the agreements included mutual liability releases. At W.R. Grace, CEO J.P. Bolduc left in 1995 after a boardroom power struggle with his predecessor, in which the two sides traded allegations of sexual harassment and financial irregularities involving family members. Bolduc, age 55, received a separation package valued at more than $20 million. At Sprint, CEO William T. Esrey, age 63, was ousted in 2003 after a 17 year tenure. Esrey had followed the advice of the company's auditing firm and established a personal tax shelter that was challenged by the Internal Revenue Service. The CEO received a large bill for back taxes, and a public three-way conflict developed between the CEO, the auditors, and the company. Esrey received a separation package worth about $12.5 million. 8 adversary of the company, a role in which he might initiate litigation, sound off in the news media, sabotage the transition to his successor, cooperate with regulatory investigations, or take part in hostile takeover attempts.
3 Litigation by disgruntled ex-CEOs is perhaps the most common of these problems, and its basis is usually not the dismissal event itself, but instead the costs incurred by the CEO if the company abridges various compensation instruments, such as unvested stock options, executive loans, deferred compensation, or pensions. 4 Separation agreements therefore often require the ex-CEO to release the firm from any legal liability in connection with his termination. 5 If severance pay helps limit costs related to litigation, adverse publicity, information disclosure, and related problems, then a positive relation should exist between severance pay and expected future compensation of dismissed CEOs, because lost future compensation represents the opportunity cost to these managers of termination.
D. Rent extraction
In line with the frequent portrayal of separation agreements in the news media, a further theory of severance pay would be that it represents rent extraction by powerful managers who are able to obtain extra compensation beyond the value of their human capital (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) . The rent extraction theory of severance pay should apply only in cases of voluntary turnover, since CEOs who are fired would appear to lack control over their firms' governance. The main empirical predictions of the theory would be (i) a positive association between prior annual over-compensation and the level of severance pay, since CEOs'
ability to obtain excess compensation should be high at both the middle and the end of their careers, and (ii) a negative association between severance pay and the quality of corporate governance. In addition, the theory suggests that severance pay should be delivered in a nontransparent form, since boards might want to conceal from shareholders the true value transferred to departing managers.
II. Sample selection and description
I analyze CEO turnover events in a panel of 237 companies that were members of the estimate each CEO's past excess compensation using the ExecuComp variable for three-year compensation, for the period ending in the last full year prior to the turnover year (this year must be omitted from the calculation because it may include the value of the separation package). I regress the log of each CEO's three-year compensation against the log of sales, the firm's threeyear net-of-market stock return compounded continuously, and dummy variables for two-digit SIC industries and individual years. The regression sample includes the latest observation for all
ExecuComp CEOs with at least three years tenure for whom the three-year compensation and stock return variables are not missing. The sample analyzed contains 2,087 observations, the 6 Both employment contracts and negotiated separation agreements with company officers are required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as exhibits to the company's Form 10-Q or 10-K that covers the period in which the contract becomes effective, according to SEC Regulation S-K,17 CFR 229.601(a)(4) (see Instructions to Exhibit Table, paragraph (10)(ii)(D)(iii)(A)). The filing deadline for an agreement is therefore the same as the filing deadline for the 10-Q or 10-K. Of the 89 negotiated separation agreements in my sample, 42 were filed in a 10-K at fiscal year-end and 39 were filed mid-year in a 10-Q. The remaining eight contracts were filed ahead of disclosure deadlines in either a Form 8-K (extraordinary events) or S-4 (registration statement). The majority of contracts are filed within several months after the CEO's departure, although 20 of 89 agreements were filed in advance. In seven cases in which the ex-CEO remained for a period as Chairman of the Board, the separation agreements did not become effective immediately and were not filed for more than a year after his departure as CEO.
12 estimated regression has an r-squared of 0.456, and estimated coefficients are 0.41 for the log of sales and 0.14 for the three-year stock return, both statistically significant. For the 179 exiting CEOs in my sample, 147 have enough information to appear in the regression sample. From the excess compensation regression, I save the expected values of the log of three-year compensation and exponentiate them. I then estimate prior excess compensation as the difference between actual three-year compensation and the regression's expected value.
About one-third of CEOs in my sample have employment contracts at the time of their exits, and this frequency is somewhat higher though not significantly different for CEOs who are dismissed compared to those who retire voluntarily. As shown in data below, the existence of an employment contract is important for a departing CEO, because the company must continue making payments for the duration of the contract if the CEO does not retire voluntarily.
Exiting CEOs often enter into written separation agreements with their firms. I search SEC filings to obtain all such agreements, and I locate them for just under half of the sample observations. 6 If no written separation agreement exists, I rely on disclosures of compensation in companies' proxy statements to provide information about the separation pay received by exiting CEOs (many exiting CEOs are covered by proxy disclosure rules for several years after leaving office, since they often continue serving on the board of directors 
A. Contracted and discretionary separation pay
When a CEO works under an employment contract and is dismissed, in most cases the contract specifies minimum separation pay either directly, in a special contract term, or indirectly, since the CEO continues receiving compensation until the contract expires. A CEO who retires voluntarily in the middle of a contract generally is not entitled to severance, unless the board awards it discretionarily or the CEO negotiates to retain his status as an employee, perhaps while serving as Chairman of the Board. Employment contracts therefore affect the amount of separation a CEO receives and also the form in which it is delivered. Data in Table II indicate that CEOs who are dismissed have employment contracts more often than those who retire voluntarily, though the difference is not significant.
An empirical study of CEO employment contracts appears in Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2005) . That study's sample of S&P 500 firms, analyzed in 2000, overlaps considerably with the sample for this paper. The authors find that employment contracts are more common when a CEO is young, when he has been hired outside the firm, when the board has a high percentage of independent directors, when a predecessor CEO had been fired in the past five years, when the firm competes in a non-homogenous industry, and when the firm's stock has low volatility. Several of these relations, such as CEO age, board independence, and a past history of CEO dismissals, suggest a positive association between the incidence of employment contracts and the ex ante probability of CEO removal. I divide the total severance package for each subsample into two quantities, those that are mandated by the employment contract (which equal zero by definition for the no-contract subsample), and those that are awarded discretionarily by the board. Table III shows 
B. Elements of discretionary CEO separation pay
I disaggregate data about discretionary separation pay, not required by an employment contract, into four categories. As an example, J.P. Morgan Chase CEO Walter Shipley retired in 1999 at age 63, and according to the company's 1999 proxy statement, he was entitled to a pension of $897,577 beginning at age 65 in a joint and 50% survivor life annuity. The next year, the 2000 proxy statement reported that Shipley had begun drawing a $1,600,000 annual pension at age 64 in a joint and 100% survivor life annuity. These three adjustments --increasing the annual amount, changing the survivor payout from 50% to 100%, and beginning payments one year earlier --increased its actuarial value by more than $7.5 million, assuming that Shipley had a wife the same age as him. The company gave no explanation for the changes, nor did it disclose their value consequences.
8 Each firm's default treatment of equity compensation for exiting employees appears in the documents associated with its executive compensation plans, which are filed as attachments to company proxy statements or Forms 10-K or 10-Q. Stock options and restricted shares that have not yet vested are generally forfeited when an executive leaves the firm, unless he has attained a minimum retirement age such as 55 or 60. If he has reached retirement age, the executive retains his shares or options, and some companies also allow unvested equity awards to vest. The remaining exercise period for stock options under these conditions will generally be truncated. For CEOs in my sample, I observe a variety of deviations from companies' standard policies, including waiver of forfeiture rules, more generous vesting than usual, and longer exercise periods. I compare the treatment of each CEO's equity compensation to the company's standard policies, and I calculate the resulting value impact for each CEO. For stock options, these calculations involve 16 discretionary packages with positive value, with significantly larger payments awarded to the forced turnover subsample. Categories of discretionary separation pay include:
• Lump-sum payments. These can include cash, forgiveness of loans from the company, and new awards of stock or options. Rather than label these as "severance pay," firms generally characterize them euphemistically as consideration for such things as "effecting a smooth transition to his successor," "leadership in the management transition process," or the CEO's "personal sacrifice of electing early retirement."
• Consulting and non-compete agreements. Many companies enter into contracts that will be paid out over a number of years, in consideration for the exiting CEO's agreement not to compete against the company, and/or to serve as a consultant. I take the present value of these payments, discounted at the firm's cost of debt as inferred from its bond rating.
• Pension augmentations. Some companies adjust the terms of CEOs' lifetime defined benefit pensions. Pension benefits often depend upon length of service, and some firms add extra service time or permit CEOs to begin drawing full pensions earlier than the normal age (usually 65). Value consequences of these changes are usually very opaque.
7
• Adjustments to equity compensation. Most exiting CEOs hold unvested stock options and restricted shares. All companies have policies for how to treat these awards when executives leave the company, and in some cases, the company deviates from its standard policies in ways that add considerable value to a CEO's holdings.
Black-Scholes valuations before and after any adjustments of their terms. For restricted stock, calculations involve multiplying the number of shares that the CEO obtains extraordinarily by the stock price on his date of exit. Within the sample, maximum values of these adjustments are extremely large, as two dismissed CEOs obtain more than $100 million. In both cases the CEOs were younger than the company's standard retirement age for retaining equity awards but were nevertheless permitted to keep millions of unvested shares and/or options. Minimum sample values are below zero, as a few CEO separation agreements call for shortening option lives even more than under ordinary circumstances. Some CEOs' employment contracts include pre-negotiated terms for the treatment of equity compensation if the CEO leaves the firm. In these cases I compare the contracted terms to the company's default policies, and the value of any benefit for the CEO counts as part of his contractual separation pay. Any further change in the treatment of the CEO's equity awards, when compared to the contracted terms, is counted as discretionary separation pay.
I do not take account of compensation that some ex-CEOs receive for service as a member of the board, usually as Chairman. Often exiting CEOs remain as Chairman of the Board, even in some cases of forced turnover, and their compensation may remain at the CEO level for at least one to two years. It is not clear whether this remuneration should be viewed as disguised severance pay or whether the former CEO is genuinely earning additional pay for duties performed as Chairman; the sample probably includes observations of both types. Also, many exiting CEOs obtain fringe benefits in retirement such as country club memberships, automobiles, office space, premium health coverage, personal security, and so forth. One CEO in my sample negotiated for continued control over his company's box seats at the U.S. Open tennis championships, and no less than 16 exiting CEOs, all of them cases of voluntary turnover, received access to company aircraft for personal travel for periods ranging from five years to life. I do not include these perks in my calculations due to the difficulty of valuing them.
Finally, I do not include gains or losses to a CEO when the firm's stock price reacts to the announcement of his departure. In some cases of forced turnover, company stock prices rise substantially, giving the exiting CEO consolation of a large appreciation in his equity holdings. 9 pension increase with an actuarial value exceeding $15 million; immediate vesting of certain options, restricted shares, and deferred compensation; office space and secretarial support for life; moving expenses; and a reimbursement for any loss on the sale of his residence. The company wrote in its 2002 proxy statement that the board's compensation committee was "satisfied as to the appropriateness of the terms of [McCoy's] agreement," but Bank One's stock fell by a market-adjusted 1.61 percent upon its disclosure.
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III. Regression analysis of separation pay
I analyze whether CEO separation packages conform to the theories of severance pay detailed above. Since separate theories predict patterns of separation pay for voluntary and forced CEO turnover, I estimate separate regressions for these two subsamples. Because of the large number of zero-valued separation packages, I estimate Tobit regressions, and the dependent variable for each regression equals the total value of each CEO's separation package.
The key explanatory variables in the regressions are related to each ex-CEO's compensation and career concerns as well as the firm's financial and governance structure. For voluntary turnover, the ex post settling up paradigm predicts an inverse association between a CEO's separation package and the extent to which he was paid during his career at above-market levels. An opposite, positive prediction between severance pay and prior compensation is implied by the rent extraction theory. I therefore include a variable estimating the CEO's compensation over the prior three years, calculated according to methods discussed above. For
CEOs with less than three years tenure (32 observations out of 179), I assume that this variable equals zero; this assumption is probably reasonable since CEOs whose compensation is out of line with market practices typically have served long tenures in office.
For forced turnover, various bonding hypotheses suggest that separation pay should exhibit a positive association with CEO age, since age should be related to the lifetime stream of earnings that a CEO would expect had he worked until normal retirement. The damage control theory implies a similar prediction of a positive association between severance and age. I therefore include a variable measuring the CEO's expected years to retirement, equal to the difference between 65 and the CEO's age or zero for all CEOs aged 65 and older. Certain bonding theories also expect associations between severance and the firm's financial leverage, the quality of corporate governance, and whether the CEO was hired recently outside the firm. I include measures of these three variables: for leverage I use total debt over total assets, for corporate governance I use the anti-shareholder rights index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) , and I set an indicator variable equal to 1 for CEOs hired outside the firm in the past five years. The governance index is also used to test the damage control theory, which predicts a negative association between governance quality and separation pay. Note that higher values of the index imply weaker governance, since it is a count variable measuring the number of a firm's takeover defenses and related provisions. Because the data source, the Investor Responsibility
Research Center, generally reports the variable in intervals three or four years apart, I use the value closest in time to each observation. Regressions also include the log of total assets to control for firm size, and year and industry dummy variables. Due to the relatively small number of observations, industry dummies are measured at the one-digit SIC level.
Results for the Tobit regression estimations appear in Table V I test the robustness of the regression results in several ways. First, I delete from the sample of forced turnover observations two outliers whose severance packages exceed $100 million. All estimates retain their sign and significance except the coefficient for leverage, which moves closer to zero and sees its t-statistic change to -1.07. For the years until expected retirement and the governance index, t-statistics increase after deletion of the two outliers, to 2.44 and 2.56, respectively. As a further sensitivity test, I truncate the dependent variable from its previous specification as the total CEO separation package value, and redefine it is the noncontracted, discretionary value. The subsample of voluntary turnover observations continues to exhibit no significant coefficient estimates for the key variables. Among the forced turnover observations, two variables no longer have significant estimates -the years to expected retirement, and the governance index -though the estimate for the leverage variable remains significant. A final robustness test involves deleting from both samples the 32 CEOs with less than three years service prior to the turnover year. The rationale for dropping these observations is related to the estimation of excess compensation, which requires three years of lagged data and is assumed to equal zero in the regressions shown in Table V . Dropping these observations may reduce the measurement error in the excess compensation variable and change its coefficient estimate. However, I find no such effect, as the variable's estimate remains insignificant and quite close to zero in both subsamples. Other coefficient estimates do no vary meaningfully, except that the years to expected retirement variable loses its significant estimate in the forced turnover subsample; this may occur because the deleted observations of inexperienced CEOs tend to be the youngest in the sample.
D. Transparency
Some companies' separation packages are easy for shareholders to value, since they are delivered in straightforward ways such as lump-sum payments. In other cases, CEOs' severance pay is disclosed only indirectly via changes to pension plans or equity compensation. Under the rent extraction theory, I expect that as severance packages grow larger, firms may disclose them less transparently. I investigate this conjecture in a regression model using the subsample of observations in which the separation package has positive value for discretionary pay. The dependent variable is an "opacity index," equal to the present value of a CEO's pension enhancements, plus the value of adjustments to equity compensation, divided by the total value of his discretionary separation package. This index, which I compound continuously, takes a value between zero and one, and higher values occur when the values of CEO separation agreements are more difficult to ascertain. However, a high value of the index might also occur when stock-or pension-based pay appears advantageous to for reasons other than reducing costs of disclosure; income tax reduction, smoothing accounting earnings, or the firm's liquidity may also deter the company from delivering separation pay in cash. The key explanatory variable is the size of the CEO's incremental separation pay compared to its predicted level. This difference is assumed to be the residual from the Tobit regression model in Table V, augmented by a dummy variable for forced turnover observations (results are insensitive to using instead the separate residuals from the two subsample regressions in Table V) . Control variables include return on assets, since profitable firms may be less reluctant to report high compensation, and dummy variables for years and one-digit SIC indicators. The regression estimates, which are untabulated in order to save space, indicate that a significantly negative association exists between the transparency of a CEO's separation package and the extent to which a package is larger than expected. In addition, packages for dismissed CEOs have less transparency than packages for voluntarily retired CEOs. Together, these findings provide mixed support for the rent extraction theory of separation pay. Under this theory, it is not surprising that larger packages are delivered in a non-transparent form, but it is unexpected to find the least transparent packages being awarded to CEOs who are dismissed.
IV. Stock returns upon disclosure of separation packages
I evaluate shareholder reactions to CEO separation agreements by calculating abnormal stock returns for dates of disclosure of these packages for the 179 CEOs in the sample. It is not clear ex ante whether shareholders should regard severance payments positively or negatively.
Under the ex post settling up theory, for example, a large separation package might indicate that the CEO had performed better than previously understood, which would be good news for shareholders. Alternatively, a rich package for a mediocre CEO might signal that the board had little skill at evaluating managers, which would be bad news. The various bonding theories of severance pay yield similarly ambiguous predictions. Severance pay may indicate that the CEO had made positive NPV investments that didn't work out, which would perhaps convey positive information about the firm's governance. Alternatively, severance pay may indicate that the CEO possessed adverse inside information about the firm's governance quality or its future performance and elected to resign because he forecast low future compensation for himself.
Under the damage control theory, the expected reaction of shareholders to separation pay is also ambiguous. Severance packages could be positive news for shareholders, indicating that the firm had limited costs that might have been high. However, they could also indicate possible problems within the firm and therefore send an adverse signal. Only the rent extraction theory seems to yield a clear prediction, that severance pay should result in negative stock returns, since its disclosure would indicate that the firm's governance was too ineffective to prevent expropriation of resources by its managers. Even if shareholders had believed governance to be poor, the payment of large severance might resolve uncertainty about such beliefs.
In my event study analysis, the event date is the earliest of (i) the proxy statement filing describing the terms of the CEO's separation, (ii) the Form 10-K, 10-Q, or other filing in which a negotiated separation agreement is included as an exhibit, or (iii) the date on which a company news release publicizes details of the CEO's exit package. For CEOs receiving zero separation pay, the event date is the first proxy statement filed after the year of their departure, the latest point at which any separation package would have ordinarily been disclosed. I drop five events in which the CEO's dismissal was announced simultaneously with his separation package.
Abnormal stock returns are calculated over an interval beginning four trading days prior to the event day and ending one trading day after, using standard market model methods with the CRSP value-weighted index as the market portfolio. Results below are generally insensitive to reasonable variations in the estimation procedure. Abnormal stock returns at the disclosure of separation packages are nearly orthogonal to the abnormal returns at the announcement of CEOs' departures, with a correlation coefficient of -0.037.
Results in Table VI 
V. Conclusions
This paper studies separation payments to CEOs when leaving their firms, compensation commonly known as "golden handshakes." Just over half of exiting CEOs in my sample from Several results appear to support an interpretation that boards use severance pay to assure CEO of a minimum lifetime wage level. CEOs who retire voluntarily receive less severance than CEOs who are forced out, perhaps because the former will continue to obtain benefits from board service and will probably retire with higher values of accumulated equity compensation.
In cases of forced turnover, younger CEOs, for whom the costs of dismissal are higher, get more severance than older CEOs who are forced out, and the overall value of separation pay generally seems unrelated to whether or not a CEO had an employment contract. All of these patterns suggest that certain norms of equity or fairness influence firms' decisions about how to compensate exiting CEOs, without clear attention to any theory of economic optimization. Differences in right two columns are significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels, according to T-tests (means) and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (identical distributions). Differences in top two panels are significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels, according to T-tests (means) and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (identical distributions).
Table V Regression estimates of separation pay
Tobit estimates of the total value of separation pay for 179 Fortune 500 CEOs who left their positions between 1996 and 2002. Excess prior compensation is estimated over the three years prior to CEO turnover based upon the residual from a standard compensation regression model, and is set equal to zero for all CEOs with less than three years service. Expected years to retirement equals the greater of zero and 65 minus the CEO's age. The indicator for recent outside hire equals 1 if the exiting CEO was hired from outside the firm within the past five years. The anti-shareholder rights index is based on the method of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . Pseudo r 2 is calculated according to Veall and Zimmermann (1994) . Compensation variables are measured in millions of dollars, and firm size is measured in billions. Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels.
Table VI Abnormal stock returns at announcement of separation packages
Mean cumulative abnormal stock returns around the disclosure of separation packages for a sample of 179 exiting CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1996 and 2002. Abnormal returns are calculated for an event window beginning four days prior to the disclosure date and ending one day after, using standard market model methodology. Disclosure dates occur when a company makes an SEC filing that describes details of the CEO's package, or, in a small number of cases, by making a public news announcement. The top rows of the table include data for the entire sample, excluding five disclosure events that took place simultaneously with the announcement of the CEO's dismissal. The bottom rows omit observations for exiting CEOs who received zero discretionary separation payments. For CEOs receiving zero payments, the event date is the first proxy statement filing after the CEO leaves office.
All CEOs Observations
Mean cumulative abnormal return Median cumulative abnormal return Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels, based upon T-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum and signed-rank tests.
